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What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?
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Resty Wyse
2019-05-12 03:46:55 UTC
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What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?

https://www.quora.com/

Paul Clifford
Answered 12h ago

What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?

The USA will become more irrelevant to international trade than it already is!

There is very little manufactured in the USA that can’t be sourced elsewhere at better quality and at a cheaper price.

Currently, there are niche products produced by the USA (mainly electronic components) that would require a high capital investment to install factories elsewhere, so it is more economic to import from the USA.

That is changing because of Trump’s ill advised sanctions and tariffs.

Manufacturers are looking for alternative suppliers, and they do exist on a small scale outside of the USA. It would just take attraction of investment to boost production to the level of mass production. When that happens (not if) the USA will be totally irrelevant to international commerce.

Of course, the USA maintains a war economy. It makes its greatest national profits from organising & perpetuating conflict and supplying armament needs to belligerents, in destabilised geographies.

Trump has managed to piss off the USA’s traditional trading partners, and its military allies more than it has the USA’s foes. Still, the world is forced to placate the USA, otherwise the USA threatens the employment of force to gets its way. The general international hope is at the next USA election, Trump and his mandarins will lose government, and rationality will prevail.

The other day, it was reported in the economic press, that one of Trump’s henchman, proclaimed “The USA is an empire, and those who reject our commands, face repercussions”. This was actually a belligerent threat to the USA’s supposed allies in Europe!

The world was fascinated to learn that the USA now has an absolute monarch, a dictator!

Disclaimer: I am a 5th generation Australian of Irish-anglo heritage. Imo, Trump’s demonstrated ignorance in all things economic & political is a danger to worldwide security.

2k views · View Upvoters
Jesus Christ is a WHITE RACE monopoly Power
2019-05-12 05:51:42 UTC
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TRUMP will get kick back commission
w***@yahoo.com.sg
2019-05-12 06:10:41 UTC
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If there is no trade deal, China will just carry on with life, while Americans will pay for their leaders' stupidity, and Trump will run a greater risk of losing the election in 2020.

Wakalukong
Resty Wyse
2019-05-12 16:31:02 UTC
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Post by w***@yahoo.com.sg
If there is no trade deal, China will just carry on with life, while Americans will pay for their leaders' stupidity, and Trump will run a greater risk of losing the election in 2020.
Wakalukong
Resty Wyse
2019-05-12 16:33:22 UTC
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On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 11:10:42 PM UTC-7, ***@yahoo.com.sg wrote:
China will set up trade with other countries, by passing America altogether as it is already doing by setting up BRI!!!
s***@gmail.com
2019-05-12 18:34:54 UTC
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Post by Resty Wyse
What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?
China will set up trade with other countries, by passing America altogether as it is already doing by setting up BRI!!!
The real question is what will happen to you, Yale Guen Mar (Resty Wyse(? You'll have to buy costlier Made-in-China stuff like your catheter and diapers. That will force you to work even harder on the newsgroup to get approved for evermore posts by the CCP so that you get your 50 cents.

And the extra tariff that USA will earn at your expense can very well be used to fund the bullet train in California. May be you won't have to be restricted to the Nerced-Bakersville stretch. Money extracted from you by Trump with increased tariffs on Made-in-China products you have been patronizing can now be used to connect Merced to San Franciso and to Los Angeles by the bullet train.
w***@yahoo.com.sg
2019-05-13 01:37:24 UTC
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Now that China has disclosed the 3 hurdles to a trade deal, I hope there will be no trade deal, at least not a trade deal incorporatimg the 3 hurdles, which are:

1) the US wants its additional tariffs to continue even after a trade deal (which is absurd),

2) the US wants the right to unilaterally impose purchase targets on China, even if market demands do not match the targets imposed (sounds every bit like how the old USSR ran its economy until it imploded),

3) the US wants a master-servant relationship, like in the days of gunboat diplomacy (obviously, the Chinese will tell the US to get lost).

Wakalukong
tom
2019-05-14 03:32:07 UTC
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No country in the world will buy such US ideas of impositions on their
purchasers.

So China should never engage into this at all.

It's time for China to leave the trade talk table before getting into
entrapment.

China can find new BRI markets to replace US market if the Americans reduced
their demands.

And if they find their US import tax by their president is hard to pay off
by them.




wrote in message news:53f49d8d-e860-4130-b081-***@googlegroups.com...

Now that China has disclosed the 3 hurdles to a trade deal, I hope there
will be no trade deal, at least not a trade deal incorporatimg the 3
hurdles, which are:

1) the US wants its additional tariffs to continue even after a trade deal
(which is absurd),

2) the US wants the right to unilaterally impose purchase targets on China,
even if market demands do not match the targets imposed (sounds every bit
like how the old USSR ran its economy until it imploded),

3) the US wants a master-servant relationship, like in the days of gunboat
diplomacy (obviously, the Chinese will tell the US to get lost).

Wakalukong
dubenski
2019-05-13 18:32:39 UTC
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All these trade balance talks and IP talks are entrapments that China should
not engage.

Now, even a word that wanted to change by China has been accused loudly by
the US in a bullied way that said China is reneging its agreement made in
the trade talk.

Given that US patent office in the established US office, the US can deny
and even claim they did not receive the patent application.

The US patent office can get their people to pass on the Chinese application
to their US spies to apply for their application first and then claim.

It then accused the Chinese companies for infringing their patent copyright
which they will claim is being pending in the US patent office.

Another thing is how could the US ask China or even other countries to buy
its products when there are no demands for them.

Demand is dependent on comparative of price and quality. Some buyers in
China and other countries may want a cheaper-made Chinese product instead,
of buying US-made expensive product.

Another thing is does Trump think that American consumers can be forced to
buy, for example, China-made cars,

if they are not interested in then. Can China insist US buyers to buy its
products if they are not in demand for them?

Finally, it is important for the US to know that there is always demand and
supply side of purchase by each country, and price is being a key
consideration, too.

Since Trump twiddle last Friday ordered additional tariffs on China, there
is not much need for China to reason out with them anymore.

Therefore, China has to accept the additional tariff sanctions except to
bring to the attention of WTO for action.

Meantime, China should just continue to run its businesses and also building
up their BRI projects to assist other countries to realise their economic
freedoms instead.





"Resty Wyse" wrote in message news:5f0a5c81-f3b3-43cd-9881-***@googlegroups.com...

What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade
agreement?

https://www.quora.com/

Paul Clifford
Answered 12h ago

What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade
agreement?

The USA will become more irrelevant to international trade than it already
is!

There is very little manufactured in the USA that can’t be sourced elsewhere
at better quality and at a cheaper price.

Currently, there are niche products produced by the USA (mainly electronic
components) that would require a high capital investment to install
factories elsewhere, so it is more economic to import from the USA.

That is changing because of Trump’s ill advised sanctions and tariffs.

Manufacturers are looking for alternative suppliers, and they do exist on a
small scale outside of the USA. It would just take attraction of investment
to boost production to the level of mass production. When that happens (not
if) the USA will be totally irrelevant to international commerce.

Of course, the USA maintains a war economy. It makes its greatest national
profits from organising & perpetuating conflict and supplying armament needs
to belligerents, in destabilised geographies.

Trump has managed to piss off the USA’s traditional trading partners, and
its military allies more than it has the USA’s foes. Still, the world is
forced to placate the USA, otherwise the USA threatens the employment of
force to gets its way. The general international hope is at the next USA
election, Trump and his mandarins will lose government, and rationality will
prevail.

The other day, it was reported in the economic press, that one of Trump’s
henchman, proclaimed “The USA is an empire, and those who reject our
commands, face repercussions”. This was actually a belligerent threat to the
USA’s supposed allies in Europe!

The world was fascinated to learn that the USA now has an absolute monarch,
a dictator!

Disclaimer: I am a 5th generation Australian of Irish-anglo heritage. Imo,
Trump’s demonstrated ignorance in all things economic & political is a
danger to worldwide security.

2k views · View Upvoters
w***@yahoo.com.sg
2019-05-14 01:03:40 UTC
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Forget about any trade deal. Let Trump punish Americans with higher tariffs on all Chinese imports.

Wakalukong
Byker
2019-05-14 15:35:18 UTC
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Post by dubenski
All these trade balance talks and IP talks are entrapments that China
should not engage.
If bad comes to worse...
---------------------------------------------
Terrifying Tale: Why A War Between China and America Would Be All Sorts of
Awful

Here's why.

by Robert Farley

Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.

How does the unthinkable happen? As we wind our way to the 100th anniversary
of the events that culminated in World War I, the question of unexpected
wars looms large. What series of events could lead to war in East Asia, and
how would that war play out?

The United States and China are inextricably locked in the Pacific Rim’s
system of international trade. Some argue that this makes war impossible,
but then while some believed World War I inevitable, but others similarly
thought it impossible.

In this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical details
of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major
combatants before, during, and after the conflict. A war between the United
States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East
Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a
conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First
Sino-American War.”

How the War Would Start

Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s
Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over
Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North
Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force
the PRC and the US reluctantly into war.

This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means
that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military
conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still
include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve
disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict
with India along the Tibetan border.

The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese
dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance
commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold,
the possibility for war will endure.

Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack
against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US
military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets
before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely
difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay
the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation.

Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This
doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF)
have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United
States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese
intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it
can begin engaging Chinese forces.

If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow
the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first
strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a
“bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will
steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on
the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is
genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups,
shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving
fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to
decide whether to push forward or back down.

On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions
(the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze
each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin
the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the
rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt
global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in
industrial production.

How do the Allies Respond

Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the
war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States
can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming
from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If
events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some
of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. Australia may also support
the US over a wide range of potential circumstances.

China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing
could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and
spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese
diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential
US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including
reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of
confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the
implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States).

North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the
part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean
counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless
Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United
States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may
spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict.

War Aims

The US will pursue the following war aims:

1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN).

2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army
Air Force (PLAAF).

3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland
China.

Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the
first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or
preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing
their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks
against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft
held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will
target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an
effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably
depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese
expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN
and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US
military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic
campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political
effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against
CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of
escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system.

The PLA will pursue these ends:

1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose.

2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as
possible.

3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate
intervention.

4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia.

The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in
combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. The second
involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic
missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East
Asia.

The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to
inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers
will hesitate to use force against the PRC. Similarly, the survival of the
US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat
Chinese aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and
collapse.

The United States hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War,
and hasn’t lost a major warship since World War II. The sinking of a warship
would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action
for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. However, both US and
Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a
major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least
in the short term) rather than undermine it.

The “Hold Your Breath” Moments

The biggest moment will come when the PLA makes an overt attack against a US
aircraft carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation
against the United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to
attack a US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message
sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to
defeat and destroy enemy military forces.

The means for this attack matters. An attack launched from a ship or a
submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States,
but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second
Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations.

The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley
against a carrier. This is true not simply because these missiles are
difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear
warheads. The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic
missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive
nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity.

The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles
strike Chinese targets. Given the overwhelming nuclear advantage that the
United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks will prove
deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. This is
particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can win at the
conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States
will bump to nuclear in order to retain its advantage.

We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset
of hostilities. The surface fleet is a different story, however. In any high
intensity combat scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see
Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with
air and subsurface assets. Indeed, even hiding in port probably won’t
prevent attacks on the PLAN’s largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning
and the big new amphibious transport docks.

China will only sortie the PLAN under two circumstances; if it feels it has
sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively
unmolested, or if China’s position has become desperate. In either
situation, US submarines will pose the most immediate threat to the surface
forces.

Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose,
not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military forces. This means
that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical
point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China
Sea. The PLA will need to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can
conduct surface support missions.

Who Will Win?

The most difficult question to judge is “who will win?” because that
question involves assessing a wide variety of unknowns. We don’t know how
well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive
US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how dangerous the F-22
Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the
different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. Finally, we
don’t know when the war will start; both the PLA and the US military will
look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014.

However, in general terms the battle will turn on these questions:

1. Electronic Warfare:

How severely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications,
electronic, and surveillance capabilities? Attacking US forces will depend
on communication between seers and shooters. To the extent that the US can
disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. Conversely, Chinese
cyber-warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for
American policymakers.

2. Missiles vs. Missile Defenses:

How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese ballistic and
cruise missiles? The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering
array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in
depth. The American capacity to survive the onslaught depends in part on the
effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as
the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China.

3. Joint Operations:

How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context
of high intensity, disruptive military operations? Unlike the US military,
the PLA has little relevant combat experience from the last three decades.
On the flipside, how well will US “Air-Sea Battle” work prepare the USN and
the USAF for working together?

4. Quality vs. Quantity:

Chinese forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in
some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. The (narrowing) gap
between US and Chinese technology and training will determine how well
American forces can survive and prevail in such situations.

How the War Would End

This war doesn’t end with a surrender signed on a battleship. Instead, it
ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the
next round.

The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the
collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the
collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands
conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a
significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic
distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is
an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count
on victory leading to a new revolution.

What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United
States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance
framework that motivates and legitimates US action. The United States cannot
continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no
longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing
significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US
economy.

The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict.
The United States has “lost” wars in the past, but these defeats have
generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical
to US global interests. It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a
major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer
competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The
President and political party that led the US into war would likely suffer
dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore
off.

The biggest diplomatic and political challenge that both countries face will
probably be finding a way for the other side to give up while maintaining
its “honor.” No one benefits if this war becomes a struggle for regime
survival, or for national prestige.

How the Peace Begins

The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a
basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power.
World War I could not change the fact that Germany would remain the largest
and most powerful state in Central Europe. Similarly, war is unlikely to
change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness.

A key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic
relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim.
Regardless of how the war plays out, it will almost certainly disrupt
patterns of trade and investment around the world. If either side decides to
attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could
devastate firms and countries that have no direct stake in the war. However,
the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to
facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in consumer
goods.

China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the
United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect
that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace most
losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia.
Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian
shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover, the war will, by necessity,
“modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet
of ships and planes will replace the legacy force.

War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in
combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel.
This will lead to better, more realistic training for the next generations
of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will
likely be more lethal a decade after the war.

The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only
because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts.
The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US no
longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point
that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This
might prove particularly problematic if the war demonstrated severe problems
with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN,
and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would
wreck force planning for the foreseeable future.

The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question. In
victory or defeat, the US will suffer substantial military and economic
damage. Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China; even
in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still
dispute China’s littoral.

Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.

A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term
project of containing China. The US could respond by redoubling its efforts
to outpace the Chinese military, although this would provoke an arms race
that could prove devastating to both sides. However, given the lack of
ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a
tough sell.

Finally, the United States could respond by effectively removing itself from
the East Asian political scene, at least in a military sense. This option
would be hard for many in the US to swallow, given that generations of
American foreign policy-makers have harbored hegemonic ambitions.

Conclusion

The window for war between the United States and China will, in all
likelihood, last for a long time. Preventing war will require tremendous
skill and acumen from diplomats and policymakers. Similarly, the demands of
positioning either side for victory will continue to tax diplomatic,
military, and technological resources for the foreseeable future. At the
moment, however, we shouldn’t forget that China and the United States
constitute the heart of one of the most productive economic regions the
world has ever seen. That’s something to protect, and to build on.
Resty Wyse
2019-05-14 16:45:36 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Byker
Post by dubenski
All these trade balance talks and IP talks are entrapments that China
should not engage.
If bad comes to worse...
---------------------------------------------
Terrifying Tale: Why A War Between China and America Would Be All Sorts of
Awful
Here's why.
by Robert Farley
Your asumption is all wrong from the very beginning!!!
Post by Byker
Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.
How does the unthinkable happen? As we wind our way to the 100th anniversary
of the events that culminated in World War I, the question of unexpected
wars looms large. What series of events could lead to war in East Asia, and
how would that war play out?
The United States and China are inextricably locked in the Pacific Rim’s
system of international trade. Some argue that this makes war impossible,
but then while some believed World War I inevitable, but others similarly
thought it impossible.
In this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical details
of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major
combatants before, during, and after the conflict. A war between the United
States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East
Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a
conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First
Sino-American War.”
How the War Would Start
Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s
Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over
Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North
Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force
the PRC and the US reluctantly into war.
This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means
that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military
conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still
include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve
disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict
with India along the Tibetan border.
The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese
dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance
commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold,
the possibility for war will endure.
Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack
against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US
military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets
before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely
difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay
the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation.
Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This
doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF)
have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United
States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese
intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it
can begin engaging Chinese forces.
If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow
the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first
strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a
“bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will
steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on
the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is
genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups,
shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving
fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to
decide whether to push forward or back down.
On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions
(the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze
each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin
the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the
rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt
global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in
industrial production.
How do the Allies Respond
Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the
war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States
can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming
from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If
events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some
of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. Australia may also support
the US over a wide range of potential circumstances.
China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing
could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and
spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese
diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential
US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including
reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of
confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the
implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States).
North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the
part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean
counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless
Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United
States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may
spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict.
War Aims
1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN).
2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army
Air Force (PLAAF).
3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland
China.
Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the
first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or
preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing
their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks
against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft
held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will
target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an
effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably
depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese
expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN
and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US
military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic
campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political
effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against
CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of
escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system.
1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose.
2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as
possible.
3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate
intervention.
4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia.
The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in
combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. The second
involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic
missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East
Asia.
The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to
inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers
will hesitate to use force against the PRC. Similarly, the survival of the
US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat
Chinese aggression;
China has never been aggressive!!!
All aggressions come from the U.S. and European nations.

All your war scenarios are non-sense.
As Putin said it:
All you have to do is a couple of nukes at Yellowstone National Park,
and the super-volcano will do the rest.
There is no need for war to destroy the U.S.
Mother Nature has a very powerful and deadly weapon hidden in the U.S.

Besides, from previous wars have proven all American military generals were nincompoops. The Vietnam War proved it. So did the Afghanistan War. We bragged how we defeated Germany in WWII. In reality, Russia defeated Germany. Russian troops were advancing toward the German border on D-Day!!!
Post by Byker
if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and
collapse.
The United States hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War,
and hasn’t lost a major warship since World War II. The sinking of a warship
would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action
for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. However, both US and
Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a
major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least
in the short term) rather than undermine it.
The “Hold Your Breath” Moments
The biggest moment will come when the PLA makes an overt attack against a US
aircraft carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation
against the United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to
attack a US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message
sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to
defeat and destroy enemy military forces.
The means for this attack matters. An attack launched from a ship or a
submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States,
but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second
Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations.
The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley
against a carrier. This is true not simply because these missiles are
difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear
warheads. The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic
missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive
nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity.
The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles
strike Chinese targets. Given the overwhelming nuclear advantage that the
United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks will prove
deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. This is
particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can win at the
conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States
will bump to nuclear in order to retain its advantage.
We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset
of hostilities. The surface fleet is a different story, however. In any high
intensity combat scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see
Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with
air and subsurface assets. Indeed, even hiding in port probably won’t
prevent attacks on the PLAN’s largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning
and the big new amphibious transport docks.
China will only sortie the PLAN under two circumstances; if it feels it has
sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively
unmolested, or if China’s position has become desperate. In either
situation, US submarines will pose the most immediate threat to the surface
forces.
Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose,
not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military forces. This means
that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical
point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China
Sea. The PLA will need to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can
conduct surface support missions.
Who Will Win?
The most difficult question to judge is “who will win?” because that
question involves assessing a wide variety of unknowns. We don’t know how
well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive
US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how dangerous the F-22
Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the
different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. Finally, we
don’t know when the war will start; both the PLA and the US military will
look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014.
How severely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications,
electronic, and surveillance capabilities? Attacking US forces will depend
on communication between seers and shooters. To the extent that the US can
disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. Conversely, Chinese
cyber-warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for
American policymakers.
How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese ballistic and
cruise missiles? The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering
array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in
depth. The American capacity to survive the onslaught depends in part on the
effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as
the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China.
How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context
of high intensity, disruptive military operations? Unlike the US military,
the PLA has little relevant combat experience from the last three decades.
On the flipside, how well will US “Air-Sea Battle” work prepare the USN and
the USAF for working together?
Chinese forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in
some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. The (narrowing) gap
between US and Chinese technology and training will determine how well
American forces can survive and prevail in such situations.
How the War Would End
This war doesn’t end with a surrender signed on a battleship. Instead, it
ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the
next round.
The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the
collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the
collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands
conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a
significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic
distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is
an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count
on victory leading to a new revolution.
What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United
States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance
framework that motivates and legitimates US action. The United States cannot
continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no
longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing
significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US
economy.
The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict.
The United States has “lost” wars in the past, but these defeats have
generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical
to US global interests. It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a
major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer
competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The
President and political party that led the US into war would likely suffer
dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore
off.
The biggest diplomatic and political challenge that both countries face will
probably be finding a way for the other side to give up while maintaining
its “honor.” No one benefits if this war becomes a struggle for regime
survival, or for national prestige.
How the Peace Begins
The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a
basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power.
World War I could not change the fact that Germany would remain the largest
and most powerful state in Central Europe. Similarly, war is unlikely to
change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness.
A key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic
relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim.
Regardless of how the war plays out, it will almost certainly disrupt
patterns of trade and investment around the world. If either side decides to
attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could
devastate firms and countries that have no direct stake in the war. However,
the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to
facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in consumer
goods.
China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the
United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect
that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace most
losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia.
Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian
shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover, the war will, by necessity,
“modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet
of ships and planes will replace the legacy force.
War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in
combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel.
This will lead to better, more realistic training for the next generations
of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will
likely be more lethal a decade after the war.
The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only
because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts.
The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US no
longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point
that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This
might prove particularly problematic if the war demonstrated severe problems
with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN,
and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would
wreck force planning for the foreseeable future.
The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question. In
victory or defeat, the US will suffer substantial military and economic
damage. Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China; even
in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still
dispute China’s littoral.
Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.
A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term
project of containing China. The US could respond by redoubling its efforts
to outpace the Chinese military, although this would provoke an arms race
that could prove devastating to both sides. However, given the lack of
ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a
tough sell.
Finally, the United States could respond by effectively removing itself from
the East Asian political scene, at least in a military sense. This option
would be hard for many in the US to swallow, given that generations of
American foreign policy-makers have harbored hegemonic ambitions.
Conclusion
The window for war between the United States and China will, in all
likelihood, last for a long time. Preventing war will require tremendous
skill and acumen from diplomats and policymakers. Similarly, the demands of
positioning either side for victory will continue to tax diplomatic,
military, and technological resources for the foreseeable future. At the
moment, however, we shouldn’t forget that China and the United States
constitute the heart of one of the most productive economic regions the
world has ever seen. That’s something to protect, and to build on.
Jesus Christ is a WHITE RACE monopoly Power
2019-05-14 23:31:40 UTC
Reply
Permalink
nobody wins in NUCLEATR WAR
dubenski
2019-05-18 19:11:08 UTC
Reply
Permalink
You talk cock.
Post by dubenski
All these trade balance talks and IP talks are entrapments that China
should not engage.
If bad comes to worse...
---------------------------------------------
Terrifying Tale: Why A War Between China and America Would Be All Sorts of
Awful

Here's why.

by Robert Farley

Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.

How does the unthinkable happen? As we wind our way to the 100th anniversary
of the events that culminated in World War I, the question of unexpected
wars looms large. What series of events could lead to war in East Asia, and
how would that war play out?

The United States and China are inextricably locked in the Pacific Rim’s
system of international trade. Some argue that this makes war impossible,
but then while some believed World War I inevitable, but others similarly
thought it impossible.

In this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical details
of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major
combatants before, during, and after the conflict. A war between the United
States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East
Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a
conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First
Sino-American War.”

How the War Would Start

Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s
Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over
Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North
Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force
the PRC and the US reluctantly into war.

This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means
that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military
conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still
include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve
disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict
with India along the Tibetan border.

The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese
dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance
commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold,
the possibility for war will endure.

Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack
against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US
military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets
before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely
difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay
the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation.

Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This
doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF)
have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United
States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese
intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it
can begin engaging Chinese forces.

If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow
the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first
strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a
“bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will
steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on
the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is
genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups,
shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving
fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to
decide whether to push forward or back down.

On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions
(the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze
each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin
the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the
rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt
global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in
industrial production.

How do the Allies Respond

Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the
war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States
can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming
from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If
events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some
of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. Australia may also support
the US over a wide range of potential circumstances.

China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing
could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and
spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese
diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential
US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including
reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of
confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the
implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States).

North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the
part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean
counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless
Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United
States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may
spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict.

War Aims

The US will pursue the following war aims:

1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN).

2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army
Air Force (PLAAF).

3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland
China.

Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the
first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or
preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing
their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks
against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft
held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will
target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an
effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably
depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese
expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN
and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US
military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic
campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political
effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against
CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of
escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system.

The PLA will pursue these ends:

1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose.

2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as
possible.

3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate
intervention.

4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia.

The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in
combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. The second
involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic
missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East
Asia.

The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to
inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers
will hesitate to use force against the PRC. Similarly, the survival of the
US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat
Chinese aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and
collapse.

The United States hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War,
and hasn’t lost a major warship since World War II. The sinking of a warship
would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action
for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. However, both US and
Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a
major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least
in the short term) rather than undermine it.

The “Hold Your Breath” Moments

The biggest moment will come when the PLA makes an overt attack against a US
aircraft carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation
against the United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to
attack a US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message
sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to
defeat and destroy enemy military forces.

The means for this attack matters. An attack launched from a ship or a
submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States,
but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second
Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations.

The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley
against a carrier. This is true not simply because these missiles are
difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear
warheads. The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic
missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive
nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity.

The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles
strike Chinese targets. Given the overwhelming nuclear advantage that the
United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks will prove
deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. This is
particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can win at the
conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States
will bump to nuclear in order to retain its advantage.

We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset
of hostilities. The surface fleet is a different story, however. In any high
intensity combat scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see
Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with
air and subsurface assets. Indeed, even hiding in port probably won’t
prevent attacks on the PLAN’s largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning
and the big new amphibious transport docks.

China will only sortie the PLAN under two circumstances; if it feels it has
sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively
unmolested, or if China’s position has become desperate. In either
situation, US submarines will pose the most immediate threat to the surface
forces.

Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose,
not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military forces. This means
that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical
point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China
Sea. The PLA will need to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can
conduct surface support missions.

Who Will Win?

The most difficult question to judge is “who will win?” because that
question involves assessing a wide variety of unknowns. We don’t know how
well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive
US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how dangerous the F-22
Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the
different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. Finally, we
don’t know when the war will start; both the PLA and the US military will
look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014.

However, in general terms the battle will turn on these questions:

1. Electronic Warfare:

How severely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications,
electronic, and surveillance capabilities? Attacking US forces will depend
on communication between seers and shooters. To the extent that the US can
disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. Conversely, Chinese
cyber-warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for
American policymakers.

2. Missiles vs. Missile Defenses:

How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese ballistic and
cruise missiles? The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering
array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in
depth. The American capacity to survive the onslaught depends in part on the
effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as
the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China.

3. Joint Operations:

How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context
of high intensity, disruptive military operations? Unlike the US military,
the PLA has little relevant combat experience from the last three decades.
On the flipside, how well will US “Air-Sea Battle” work prepare the USN and
the USAF for working together?

4. Quality vs. Quantity:

Chinese forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in
some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. The (narrowing) gap
between US and Chinese technology and training will determine how well
American forces can survive and prevail in such situations.

How the War Would End

This war doesn’t end with a surrender signed on a battleship. Instead, it
ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the
next round.

The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the
collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the
collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands
conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a
significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic
distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is
an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count
on victory leading to a new revolution.

What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United
States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance
framework that motivates and legitimates US action. The United States cannot
continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no
longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing
significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US
economy.

The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict.
The United States has “lost” wars in the past, but these defeats have
generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical
to US global interests. It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a
major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer
competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The
President and political party that led the US into war would likely suffer
dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore
off.

The biggest diplomatic and political challenge that both countries face will
probably be finding a way for the other side to give up while maintaining
its “honor.” No one benefits if this war becomes a struggle for regime
survival, or for national prestige.

How the Peace Begins

The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a
basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power.
World War I could not change the fact that Germany would remain the largest
and most powerful state in Central Europe. Similarly, war is unlikely to
change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness.

A key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic
relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim.
Regardless of how the war plays out, it will almost certainly disrupt
patterns of trade and investment around the world. If either side decides to
attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could
devastate firms and countries that have no direct stake in the war. However,
the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to
facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in consumer
goods.

China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the
United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect
that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace most
losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia.
Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian
shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover, the war will, by necessity,
“modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet
of ships and planes will replace the legacy force.

War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in
combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel.
This will lead to better, more realistic training for the next generations
of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will
likely be more lethal a decade after the war.

The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only
because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts.
The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US no
longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point
that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This
might prove particularly problematic if the war demonstrated severe problems
with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN,
and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would
wreck force planning for the foreseeable future.

The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question. In
victory or defeat, the US will suffer substantial military and economic
damage. Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China; even
in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still
dispute China’s littoral.

Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the
containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war
began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the
United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish
itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese
aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase
their defense expenditures.

A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term
project of containing China. The US could respond by redoubling its efforts
to outpace the Chinese military, although this would provoke an arms race
that could prove devastating to both sides. However, given the lack of
ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a
tough sell.

Finally, the United States could respond by effectively removing itself from
the East Asian political scene, at least in a military sense. This option
would be hard for many in the US to swallow, given that generations of
American foreign policy-makers have harbored hegemonic ambitions.

Conclusion

The window for war between the United States and China will, in all
likelihood, last for a long time. Preventing war will require tremendous
skill and acumen from diplomats and policymakers. Similarly, the demands of
positioning either side for victory will continue to tax diplomatic,
military, and technological resources for the foreseeable future. At the
moment, however, we shouldn’t forget that China and the United States
constitute the heart of one of the most productive economic regions the
world has ever seen. That’s something to protect, and to build on.
Byker
2019-05-18 22:08:01 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by dubenski
You talk cock.
A couple of scenarios to ponder:





s***@gmail.com
2019-05-13 19:20:57 UTC
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Permalink
Post by Resty Wyse
What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?
China will set up trade with other countries, by passing America altogether as it is already doing by setting up BRI!!!
https://www.quora.com/
Yale Guen Mar, you always repost from quora. The 64 dollar question is what you think.

Resty (Yale Guen Mar), you don't have the education to understand a lot of things in life. But it is very fortunate that Mr. Ravinder Singh's grandson has been kind enough to tutor you for free.

Resty, whenever you feel stumped (which is often), you should rush to grandson Singh and request him to explain things to you.

Yale Guen Mar, forhet the trade war, you have more important things to take care of. Think of your parents, think of your ancestors. You owe everything to them.

“Honor your father and your mother, as the Lord your God commanded you, that your days may be long, and that it may go well with you in the land that the Lord your God is giving you.”

- Deuteronomy 5:16

Yale Guen Mar, are you still mad with your mother, Kim Hi Wong?

Isn't that grossly unfair?

There are bad sons (like Yale Guen Mar) but bad mother is an oxymoron.

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topicsoc.culture.china/h4EEjkYssaw
Post by Resty Wyse
And that is certainly not the fault of your mother, Kim Hi Wong.
She was the worst of the worse.
Get over your irrational grudges.

Kim Hi Wong and Tony Chee Mar were great parents. Ellen, Donald and Eugene grew up to be accomplished citizens. If you didn't it was your own character flaws that came in the way. Don't blame them, blame yourself for your pitiable life.

Remember everything you owe Tony Chee Mar. You met Tony Chee Mar for the first time as a 11 year old FOB in San Francisco - you had arrived from Hong Kong in 1949 after the communists took over the country you were born in. Tony Chee Mar (a US citizen) declared that you were his son so that you could be in USA.

Remember what he told you when you arrived in San Francisco, "This is Thanksgiving. We are going to have turkey." Wonder-struck, you asked him, "What is Thanksgiving, what is turkey?"

Yale Guen Mar, be grateful for everything your "father" Tony Chee Mar did for you selflessly.

* Tony Chee Mar signed papers to declare you to be his son so that
you could find refuge in USA after fleeing CCP takeover of China.

* Tony Chee Mar brought you up in his home in 914 10th Street in Safford, AZ.

* Tony Chee Mar let you work in his cafe.

* Tony Chee Mar taught you English and mathematics.

* Tony Chee Mar tried to teach you the difference between
rational and irrational numbers. It is another matter that
you were too dumb to understand.

* Tony Chee Mar let you have a room in their house at 914 10th Street in Safford, AZ
long after you had reached adulthood.

* Tony Chee Mar bought you a 1963 Pontiac when you were in your mid-twenties.

* You stopped mooching off your parents only when your
siblings Ellen, Donald and Eugene put a stop to it.

And, yes, Tony Chee Mar did punish you often when you were growing up , but that was because he had to. He hoped his (and Kim Hi Wong's) punishments will help you become a better person.

Unfortunately, you were incorrigible. You just couldn't stay on the straight and narrow. This, together with the obsession you had developed as a child in rural China of finger-fucking pigs in their assholes, made sure that you were never more than the miserable self you are right now.

Yale Guen Mar, you are still blinded by rage more than a dozen years after Tony Chee Mar and Kim Hi Wong passed away.

You are angry that you got punished by Kim Hi Wong who was doing all she could to keep you in the straight and narrow but to no avail.

It seems you are still sore that Tony Chee Mar cut off your pigtail the moment you landed in San Francisco on the Thanksgiving day of 1949.

You shouldn't bear grudge against Tony Chee Mar for refusing to shave a straight line along your head either.

Tony Chee Mar wanted to be a thoughtful father for an 11-year old boy he was seeing for the first time in his life. Tony had declared himself to be your father so that you could find refuge in USA after the imposition of CCP dictatorship in Beijing.

Yale Guen Mar, your "father" didn't want you to be ridiculed and heckled by your school mates in the new country.

That is why he chopped off your pigtail as soon as you got off the boat in San Francisco. And that is why he shaved off all your hair so that you could grow a normal crew cut and meld with your classmates.

But don't be an ingrate. Tony Chee Mar did his best to bring you up properly. You owe him immense debt. The least you can do is to visit Tony Chee Mar's grave now and then. Do so on November 5 (birthday), March 28 (day of death) and, of course, at Quingming festival and the Hungry Ghost festival. You will be a happier man if you do so.
Post by Resty Wyse
Paul Clifford
Answered 12h ago
What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade agreement?
The USA will become more irrelevant to international trade than it already is!
There is very little manufactured in the USA that can’t be sourced elsewhere at better quality and at a cheaper price.
Currently, there are niche products produced by the USA (mainly electronic components) that would require a high capital investment to install factories elsewhere, so it is more economic to import from the USA.
That is changing because of Trump’s ill advised sanctions and tariffs.
Manufacturers are looking for alternative suppliers, and they do exist on a small scale outside of the USA. It would just take attraction of investment to boost production to the level of mass production. When that happens (not if) the USA will be totally irrelevant to international commerce.
Of course, the USA maintains a war economy. It makes its greatest national profits from organising & perpetuating conflict and supplying armament needs to belligerents, in destabilised geographies.
Trump has managed to piss off the USA’s traditional trading partners, and its military allies more than it has the USA’s foes. Still, the world is forced to placate the USA, otherwise the USA threatens the employment of force to gets its way. The general international hope is at the next USA election, Trump and his mandarins will lose government, and rationality will prevail.
The other day, it was reported in the economic press, that one of Trump’s henchman, proclaimed “The USA is an empire, and those who reject our commands, face repercussions”. This was actually a belligerent threat to the USA’s supposed allies in Europe!
The world was fascinated to learn that the USA now has an absolute monarch, a dictator!
Disclaimer: I am a 5th generation Australian of Irish-anglo heritage. Imo, Trump’s demonstrated ignorance in all things economic & political is a danger to worldwide security.
2k views · View Upvoters
gorde
2019-05-14 03:18:36 UTC
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Permalink
America had never trade talks with Japan or Germany, or any other countries
on IP.

There was also not even of other mandatory agreement to buy from them of how
many tons of soya bean or beefs or commodity per year even if there is no
demand for their needs.

This is the first time in the history to use "unequal treaty" to force on
China. Unequal treaty is something which has put China in a

The best is for China not to commit any of these entrapped unequal treaty
between them.

It will be a shame on China to suffer for their years ahead for being
obliged to whatever IP the US claimed was theirs and their US patent office
in aiding and manipulating them to be ahead of China.

There is also no need to obliged to buy even from the US if their domestic
market of buyers have no need for US products.

The trade treaty will make China to oblige the purchase of US products even
if the Chinese economy is on a downturn, and if their buyers may not even
need them at all.

This is downturn is also when domestic demand has changed and no customers
want the higher price higher quality products.

There is always a dynamic situation of demand and supply in the market
situation in the domestic market in every country.

So every country should wake up to that in that domestic market demand the
products and not dictated by their government's obligations, too

So China should scrap the trade deal. It is better to have no deal than
having a deal of unequal treaty that will perpetuate a lifetime of threats
from the US on them to obligate the trade deal.

The additional US tariff will not drive companies out of China. China has
the base of connectivity among companies that can connected to work to their
needs and wants.

So if China is wise this is the time to quit the trade talk.



"Resty Wyse" wrote in message news:5f0a5c81-f3b3-43cd-9881-***@googlegroups.com...

What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade
agreement?

https://www.quora.com/

Paul Clifford
Answered 12h ago

What will happen if China and the United States do not reach a trade
agreement?

The USA will become more irrelevant to international trade than it already
is!

There is very little manufactured in the USA that can’t be sourced elsewhere
at better quality and at a cheaper price.

Currently, there are niche products produced by the USA (mainly electronic
components) that would require a high capital investment to install
factories elsewhere, so it is more economic to import from the USA.

That is changing because of Trump’s ill advised sanctions and tariffs.

Manufacturers are looking for alternative suppliers, and they do exist on a
small scale outside of the USA. It would just take attraction of investment
to boost production to the level of mass production. When that happens (not
if) the USA will be totally irrelevant to international commerce.

Of course, the USA maintains a war economy. It makes its greatest national
profits from organising & perpetuating conflict and supplying armament needs
to belligerents, in destabilised geographies.

Trump has managed to piss off the USA’s traditional trading partners, and
its military allies more than it has the USA’s foes. Still, the world is
forced to placate the USA, otherwise the USA threatens the employment of
force to gets its way. The general international hope is at the next USA
election, Trump and his mandarins will lose government, and rationality will
prevail.

The other day, it was reported in the economic press, that one of Trump’s
henchman, proclaimed “The USA is an empire, and those who reject our
commands, face repercussions”. This was actually a belligerent threat to the
USA’s supposed allies in Europe!

The world was fascinated to learn that the USA now has an absolute monarch,
a dictator!

Disclaimer: I am a 5th generation Australian of Irish-anglo heritage. Imo,
Trump’s demonstrated ignorance in all things economic & political is a
danger to worldwide security.

2k views · View Upvoters
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